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Will Markets Direct Investments under the Kyoto Protocol?  




Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries can meet treaty obligations by investing in projects that 
reduce or sequester greenhouse gases elsewhere. Prior to ratification, treaty participants agreed to 
launch country-based pilot projects, referred to collectively as Activities Implemented Jointly 
(AIJ), to test novel aspects of the project-related provisions. Relying on a ten-year history of 
projects, we investigate the determinants of AIJ investment. Our findings suggest that national 
political objectives and possibly deeper cultural ties influenced project selection. This 
characterization differs from the market-based assumptions that underlie well-known estimates of 
cost-savings related to the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms. We conclude that if approaches 
developed under the AIJ programs to approve projects are retained, benefits from Kyoto’s 
flexibility provisions will be less than those widely anticipated. 
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1.  Introduction 
The strategy to limit greenhouse gas emissions laid out in the Kyoto Protocol relies on a set of 
novel market-based flexibility provisions intended to mobilize private foreign investment through 
market incentives. This is important since the scale of investment required to significantly reduce 
emissions precludes governments acting alone (Vrolijk, 2000). Further, the flexibility provisions 
are expected to greatly reduce treaty implementation costs by allowing countries to meet national 
treaty-bound emission limits by investing in projects in developing or transition economies that 
reduce global emissions at lower cost.
2 Global markets are envisioned, since the flexibility 
provisions permit trade in surplus allowances and credits generated through project investments. 
In practice, the degree to which any particular investment activity generates credits toward 
treaty obligations depends on counter-factual baselines and other unprecedented features of the 
Protocol. Moreover, although the treaty provides guiding principals for implementation, the rules 
by which projects are initiated and performance is evaluated are left largely to treaty participants. 
Consequently, the decision to invest in Kyoto projects depends significantly on the 
heterogeneous institutions established in host and investor countries and on emerging 
conventions and standards among countries.  
During debate on early drafts of the Protocol, treaty negotiators recognized that there was 
a limited understanding of how proposed investment provisions might work in practice. To gain 
experience, participants in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) agreed to set up national pilot programs and agreed to report results from the pilots 
in a standard way. The national pilots, collectively referred to as Activities Implemented Jointly 
(AIJ), provide the most significant source of available experience on projects intended to offset 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
In this paper, we make use of outcomes from the AIJ pilots to draw inferences about how 
project investments might be determined under the investment provisions of the ratified Kyoto 
Protocol. Of particular interest are the rules and procedures for reviewing, approving and 
monitoring projects that grew up under the national pilots. Descriptive studies discussed later in 
the paper suggest that these processes provided opportunities for additional, sometimes 
unrelated, national political objectives to influence project selection. This differs from the 
                                                 
2 Jacoby, Prinn and Schmalensee (1998) and McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002) provide general discussions of the 
economics of regulating greenhouse gases.   3
conceptual depiction of Kyoto-related institutions as impartial regulators of project quality and 
suggests that the institutional arrangements that gave rise to AIJ investments outcomes are not 
fully consistent with the competitive market outcomes that are anticipated from the flexibility 
provisions of the Kyoto agreement.  
Specifically, we test whether project investments under the national AIJ programs were 
independent of the types of political considerations that motivate traditional models of 
development assistance. The distinction is important because, under the Kyoto Protocol, 
countries retain discretion in establishing domestic implementation rules. Moreover, because the 
national pilots were undertaken to build experience relevant for treaty implementation, countries 
may be inclined to retain institutions built up during the pilots. If so, and if these institutions 
work to constrain investment choice, gains from the proposed flexibility mechanisms will be 
reduced. The characterization of an approval process filtered by an additional layering of political 
selection is also at odds with the least-cost assumptions that underlie most quantitative estimates 
of benefits related to the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms. Potentially, most efforts to value the 
economic effects of the Protocol are based on a flawed view of how the implemented treaty 
might work. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 contains 
background information on the origins of the AIJ program; section 3 reviews studies concerning 
the motivations for investing in AIJ projects. A conceptual model of the investment decision 
process and a derived applied model are given in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the data that 
used to estimate the model. Estimates of the applied model are presented in section 6 and related 
alternatives are considered in section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
2.  Origins of the AIJ Program 
Motivation for a treaty limiting greenhouse gas emissions stems from evidence that the global 
climate is warming and the strengthening suspicion that human activity is a significant 
contributing factor. The mechanism for this contribution relates to the greenhouse effect. Briefly, 
as the earth constantly receives energy from the sun and radiates energy back into space, water 
vapor, clouds and long-lived gases, including carbon dioxide, work to reduce the outflow of 
radiated light, creating an energy imbalance known as the greenhouse effect. In 1861, John 
Tyndall speculated that the accumulated release of carbon dioxide from combustible fossil fuels 
might increase the energy imbalance, resulting in a warming of the earth’s surface. Later, the   4
Swedish physicist, Svante Arrhenius (1896) provided a formal model of the phenomenon. 
Arrhenius predicted a gradual warming of the climate, but did not view the consequences as 
threatening. The concept was revived and given urgency in a paper by Revelle and Suess (1957) 
that stressed the potential risks and uncertainties associated with a continuing buildup of 
greenhouse gases. Subsequently, a series of debates in the scientific community led to political 
concerns, resulting in a 1989 UN resolution that initiated the process of negotiating an 
international treaty to protect the global climate by limiting greenhouse gas emissions. The 
framework for doing so was eventually established by the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in December 1997; the Protocol entered 
into force in February 2005.
3  
The cost of reducing emissions varies greatly among countries, though the effects of 
greenhouse gas emissions on climate change are uniform regardless of where the gases are 
emitted. Early drafts of the treaty soon settled on restricting the richest countries to historical 
emission levels as the primary mechanisms for limiting emissions, but debate continued on how 
to control abatement costs.
4 In the course of negotiation, the Government of Norway suggested 
that a mechanism be introduced to allow partnerships between countries that would achieve 
emission reductions at lower cost (Carraro, 1999; Dixon and Mintzer, 1999).
 Broadly, the 
approach allowed those countries facing emission limits to receive credit for investments made 
elsewhere that reduce global emissions. The concept came to be known as joint implementation 
and was subsequently adopted into the treaty negotiating documents (articles 4.2 and 3.3 of the 
UNFCCC) that are now part of the Protocol.
5 
The notion of solving pollution problems through international cooperation had 
precedent but key aspects of the climate proposal related to joint implementation were unique.
6 
The proposed measures included caps (assigned amounts) on emissions for the richest countries 
                                                 
3 As of September 2006, 166 countries had ratified the treaty, including 34 Annex I countries that represent about 
62% of 1990 emissions. 
4 Early policy discussions centered on whether permitted emission levels should be based on history or whether 
common ownership rights applied (Bertram, 1992). Proposed approaches included carbon taxes, national quantitative 
restrictions and tradable quotas. See Whalley and Wigle (1991) for an early quantitative assessment of policies under 
debate.  
5 The UNFCCC delegates later made more specific the term Joint Implementation. Under current usage, JI refers 
exclusively to projects hosted in the 36 developed countries and economies in transition listed in Annex I of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Projects hosted in non-Annex I countries are referred to as Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects. 
6 Examples of international cooperative action include the 1976 Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
Rhine River against Pollution by Chlorides and the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
(Hanafi, 1998).   5
that could be supplemented when jointly implemented projects resulted in certified reductions. 
Both assigned amounts and newly created offset credits could be traded. The supplemental 
credits, measured in tons of carbon, were to be calculated by comparing actual project emissions 
against a hypothetical counterfactual known as a baseline.
7 This framework, based on trade and 
the opportunity to supplement fixed emission allocations with project-based offsets, evolved into 
the “flexibility mechanisms” of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Delegates, advocates and researchers debated the benefits and costs of a system of 
tradable emission allowances that were not strictly capped. Delegates worried that weak controls 
and imprecise baselines might allow countries that had pledged reductions to purchase water-
downed credits cheaply from developing countries, thereby attenuating the environmental 
benefits of the treaty.
 8 In addition, delegates from developing countries expressed concern that 
donor countries would meet emission reduction targets by redirecting existing aid flows to joint 
implementation projects (Ghosh and Puri, 1994; Parikh, 1995).
9 
At subsequent negotiations in Berlin, delegates agreed that pilot projects could help 
inform the debate on practical issues surrounding joint implementation. The agreement, known 
as Decision 5 of the UNFCCC, provided broad guidelines for establishing a voluntary AIJ 
program that reflected the then-current state of debate. It declared that all AIJ projects should 
benefit the climate in real measurable ways, that each AIJ project should be agreed upon by host 
and investor governments, and that any financing from investor-government funds must be 
additional to planned aid flows -- a condition termed “financial additionality”. Moreover, to 
prevent the stockpiling of projects under lax baselines, the decision explicitly precluded the 
accrual of credits under AIJ projects. Because of this, emission reductions from AIJ projects 
cannot be credited against Kyoto obligations, even under the condition that the projects meet 
eventual standards. 
The rules set out in the Decision influenced the expectations and motivations for AIJ 
projects in standard ways for all participating countries. In addition, participants forged a 
common reporting standard to record key characteristics of projects implemented under national 
                                                 
7 See Heister, Karani, Poore, Sinha and Selrod (1999) on early World Bank experiences with baselines.  
8 Gulbrandsen and Andresen (2004) discuss the role played by nongovernmental organizations in this debate. 
9 Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack (1999) provide an account of arguments and concerns related to the flexibility 
mechanisms voiced by delegates during negotiation of the Protocol. See also criticisms in Cullet and Kameri-Mbote 
(1998).   6
AIJ programs.
10 Both features help make comparisons among AIJ projects feasible. Even so, as 
discussed below, differences among the national programs emerged, giving rise to differing 
incentives and procedures. 
3.  Related Studies 
In the next section we develop a conceptual model of how project investments came about under 
the AIJ program. Before doing so, it is useful to briefly review results from studies that discuss 
theoretical and practical motivations for carbon project investments and the country-specific 
processes by which AIJ project were approved.  
Among related studies, the largest group comprises studies that estimate the potential 
benefits of the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms. Without exception, the studies find that 
the costs of reaching greenhouse reduction goals are greatly reduced by rules that allowed spatial 
and temporal flexibility. By way of example, model results by Bernstein, Montgomery and 
Rutherford (1999) suggest that flexible trading rules could reduce the price of carbon permits – 
which can be seen as the marginal cost of emission reductions – by a factor of seven in the 
European Union and by a factor of sixteen in Japan. 
Generally, the numeric studies focus on incentives created by differences in average 
abatement costs among countries and model the resulting demand for permits arising from 
project investments. Benefit measures are calculated by comparing predictions of market-clearing 
prices for emission permits under alternative scenarios.
11 Most often, the mechanism by which 
project investments are approved is not explicitly developed, although in some cases transaction 
costs are expected to differ according to the types of partnerships formed.
12 Even so, there is an 
implicit assumption in most studies documenting the benefits of flexibility that project investors 
will be free to pursue least-cost opportunities.  
As experience emerged about project-based investments from pilot programs, a small 
group of case-based studies examined the self-declared motivations of early private sector 
                                                 
10 Convention participants assigned an advisory committee, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA) to establish reporting guidelines and to compile and publish the reports on an on-going basis. 
11See Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and Weyant (2004) for reviews of modeling approaches and results, as well as 
citations in Stevens and Rose (2002). Painuly (2001) reviews numerical models that address project-based investments 
in developing countries Muller and Mestelman (1998) review related laboratory-based experiments.  
12 See the discussion and references in Woerdman (2001).   7
participants.
 13 This set of analyses includes a study by Michaelowa, Dixon and Abron (1999) that 
looks at what motivated early AIJ participants; a study by Larson and Parks (1999) that surveys a 
broad group of early pilot participants about investment rationales; and a discussion of private 
sector participation in the US AIJ program by Lile, Powell and Toman (1998).  
The studies identify a variety of factors motivating early participants, including a desire to 
influence policy, that are only indirectly linked to market incentives. Nevertheless, the studies also 
find that many participants anticipated future regulations on greenhouse gas emissions and hoped 
to position themselves in ways that would prove useful as policies became clear. For some, this 
meant finding ways to reduce future regulatory costs, while others looked toward opportunities 
that might arise from new markets for carbon off-sets. 
Separate from the issue of what motivated the firms to participate in pilot projects is an 
examination of the national processes by which proposed investments were approved. 
Michaelowa, Begg, Parkinson and Dixon (1999) examine the application and approval process for 
AIJ projects in eleven investor countries.
14 Their description suggests that policy considerations 
influenced the projects that comprise the AIJ experiment in significant but not exclusive ways. 
They find that most countries established panels drawing on staff from three to eight ministries 
with sometimes competing objectives. In addition, six of the eleven study countries explicitly 
imposed additional criteria to reflect domestic policy goals. Nevertheless, in all cases, non-
government participants were able to influence the process, primarily by their decision to submit 
proposals. 
 The already cited study by Lile, Powell and Toman examines the approval criteria for 
projects submitted to the United States Initiative on Joint Implementation (USIJI) Evaluation 
Panel. The authors report an evaluation process that allowed seven departments and agencies to 
influence the approval process. Even so, the authors characterize the evaluation process as 
technical in nature and focused on the development of practical implementation methodology 
and implementation lessons. 
                                                 
13 Not all pilot programs fell under the AIJ umbrella and its uniform reporting system. See an early review of pilot 
schemes in Sonneborn (1999). 
14 The countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United States.   8
4.  A Model of Project Investment 
In this section, we build a conceptual model of the AIJ investment process, motivated by the 
descriptive literature from section 3. The key feature of the conceptual model is that it 
distinguishes between investments choices that are exclusively motivated by uncertain profits and 
those that are additionally constrained by an approving agency’s preferences. We then specify an 
applied model used to test predictions of the conceptual model. 
4.1.  Conceptual Model 
As a starting point, consider an irreversible investment in a joint implementation project where 
the profit flow,  ) (t π , associated with an investment I  follows the stochastic process: 
  dt s dt s d 0 0 ) ( ) ( π σ π φ π + =  1) 
where dz  is an increment in a Wiener process; and where the growth parameter,φ , and the 
dispersion parameter, σ , depend on exogenous state variables, s. It is assumed that the 
investment is sufficiently long-lived to be represented by the infinite-horizon value function: 
  dm e E s v
t m
t m t
) ( ) (
− − ∞
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δ π  2) 
where E is the expectations operator, δ  is a discount rate and where 2) is conditional on the 
restriction given in 1). Dixit and Pindyck (1994, 144-45) show that associated with this investment 
evaluation problem is a critical level,  ) (
* s v , that exceeds the combined present value of the 
investment and any option value associated with postponing an irreversible investment. In 
passing, it is important to point out that factors that reduce uncertainty decrease the option value 
associated with delay. We return to this topic later. 
Now suppose that an interested firm considers a fixed number of investment 
opportunities. By repeating, for each project, the valuation in 2), the firm can match an 
evaluation, 
i v , with each project, 
i I . After ranking the projects, the firm will consider that set of 
projects,  ) ( t s Ω  where  ) ( ) (
*
t t s v s v ≥ . The firm may consider additional restrictions, given by 
vector c.
15 With this in mind, the firm choice problem can then be written as: 
                                                 
15 For example, the firm may want to limit total investments by sector, by classes of technology or by country 
because of portfolio risk considerations.   9
  ) ( . . ) ; ( t I s I t s c I P Max Ω ∈  3) 
where P represents the firm’s decision process for evaluating risk and profit. 
Next, suppose the firm must also seek approval from an agency that has its own objective 
function, derived from a set of broad policy objectives, characterized by the vector,  ) (t z . Further, 
assume that, through a ranking process analogous to the firm’s ranking process, the agency 
derives its own set of desired investments, ) ( t z Ψ . If the agency only approves investments from 
its desired set, the choice problem now becomes: 
  { } ) ( ) ( . . ) ; ( t t I z s I t s c I P Max Ψ ∩ Ω ∈  4) 
That is, the set of feasible investments is reduced to the subset of investments that the firm 
desires and that the agency will approve. Designating the solution to 3) as 
* P and the solution to 
4) as  ' P , it follows that  ) , ( ' ) (
* z s P s P ≥ , since the reduction in feasible projects cannot improve 
the solution to the maximization problem. 
4.2.  Statistical Model 
Given the foregoing discussion, we represent the firm-ranking outcomes with the continuous 
index, η  and represent the unobserved ranking process as a linear function of the state variables 
that determine the set  ) (s Ω . For reasons that are discussed later, we identify the projects as a 
flow from investor country to host country, where i represents the country in which the 
investing firm resides, and where h represents the country hosting the project. We model the 
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where the n are parameters associated with the  j  state variables. It should be kept in mind that 
projects are pair-wise groupings, and relevant state variables may be specific to the investor, to 
the host, or to a relationship between members of the dyad. 
The latent relationship given in 5) is not observed, although investment outcomes are. 
The observed investments rank above the determined critical value so that: 
  1 = ih η  if  0 0
* > + = ∑ j
j
j ih s n n η ; otherwise  0 = ih η . 6)   10
When project investment decisions are not otherwise constrained, equation 6) adequately 
depicts the representative firm. However, as discussed, investment outcomes are potentially 
limiteded by authorizing agencies, so a mechanism to take account of this influence needs to be 
included in the applied model.  
As a starting point, we assume the variables that determine the approving agency’s 
preferences,z , relate to broad national policy objectives concerning the relationship between host 
and investor countries. It is likely that these objectives not only influence the project-ranking 
process, but are also reflected in many other aspects of bilateral political relationships. One 
objective indication of preferences is the expenditure of public funds in the form of bilateral aid. 
Coincidentally, because the classifications of UNFCC participants correspond to classes of 
economic development (developed countries, transitional economies and developing countries), 
the possible pair-wise combinations of OECD donors and aid recipients corresponds to the 
potential flow of investment (from investor to host) anticipated under the AIJ program. 
Consequently, using bilateral aid as a proxy for unobservable agency preferences is attractive 
conceptually and practically, and we make use of this in the applied model.  
In particular, we assume that governments’ ordering of preferences, as revealed in the 
provision of bilateral aid, correspond to the ranking approving agencies apply as they consider 
which projects to approve. Therefore, in a way analogous to the firm’s preference function, we 
model the agency’s ranking of projects, α , proxied by bilateral aid, as a linear function of the k 
state variables that determine the set,  ) (z Ψ  and a set of fixed parameters, a. After appending 
two random error terms, η ε  and α ε the applied model can therefore be written as the probit: 
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By assumption, both error-terms are distributed normally, that is,  ) 1 , 0 ( ~ N η ε  and  ) 1 , 0 ( ~ N α ε . 
Potentially, the error terms may also exhibit a non-zero correlation, ρ . Written in this way, the 
model belongs to a class of selection problem discussed generally by Heckman (1979), and in the 
probit form by van de Ven and van Pragg (1981). 
When agency selection occurs, the choice set is reduced to the intersection of  ) ( t s Ω  with 
) (z Ψ . As a consequence, we expect to see AIJ investments only when we also observe bilateral 
aid flows between investor and host; that is, there should be no instances when AIJ investments   11
take place between countries without bilateral aid flows. Moreover, we also expect to find a non-
zero correlation between the two error terms in the statistical model in a way that is consistent 
with the truncation of potential outcomes. Alternatively, when investment decisions are not 
subject to agency selection – that is, when firms optimize over  ) ( t s Ω  -- we expect no correlation 
between the error terms of the statistical model and any observed correspondence between 
investment flows and aid flows is attributed to coincidence. 
5.  Data Description 
5.1.  AIJ Investments 
Our dichotomous measure of AIJ investment is taken from data on AIJ projects reported to the 
UNFCCC and compiled by the SBSTA. As of February 2002, the UNFCCC reported on 156 
projects. Among these, we include in our sample the 147 projects in which a letter of intent was 
signed with the host country. The projects began between 1992 and 2001 and were distributed 
among 22 investor countries and 42 host countries (table 1).
16 For our initial analysis we focus on 
the 65 unique investor-host partnerships that evolved over the study period; that is, for our 
preferred model we define an investment event as the joint agreement by an investor country and 
a host country to participate in any number of AIJ projects. We do so for two reasons.  
First, this approach is more in keeping with descriptive studies that suggest agency 
preferences, sometimes tied to national policy objectives, were influential in screening outcomes. 
The related point of interest then is whether the agency approval hurdle is cleared for any given 
potential partnership, rather than how frequently it is cleared. Second, and importantly, in the few 
instances where the number of bilateral projects in a partnership is large, for example between 
Sweden and Estonia, many projects are replications of a common approach and distinguished 
primarily by differences among second-tier counterparts.
17 Consequently, it is not clear that giving 
greater weight to this type of investment adds to the analysis. Even so, it is possible to modify the 
statistical model to make use of the data in count form and we do so to check that our results are 
robust. We return to this topic later.  
                                                 
16 The Bonn Decision, taken in 1995, gave rise to several new national programs. However, the Decision also 
brought several established programs into the common AIJ framework. Consequently, some projects under the 
Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish and US programs were negotiated prior to the Bonn decision.  
17 Many of the projects between Sweden and Estonia involved up-grading public heating systems. These projects 
were organized under a common national framework, although local government counterparts differed among 
projects.   12
By any measure, investment partnerships were rare relative to potential partnerships. To 
see why this is so, consider that when the AIJ program was established, 193 countries participated 
in the UNFCCC.
18 Implicit in Decision 5 is the expectation that investments would originate 
from the 24 wealthier Annex II countries.
19 Excluding the Holy See, this makes for 4,032 
potential pair-wise combinations. We are constrained by data to consider a subset of countries, 
although the subset is large. We include 22 investor countries and 136 potential host countries in 
our study.
20 Consequently, there are 2,992 dyads in our sample. Defining non-events as the 2,927 
investor-host combinations for which no AIJ project is observed during the study period, the 65 
investment events in the sample are rare relative to the potential pairings and comprise about 2% 
of the observations. 
5.2.  State Variables Affecting Investment Choice 
To a degree, investments related to Kyoto carbon markets have risk and profit characteristics that 
are similar to other direct investments by foreign countries in transitional or developing countries; 
however, credits produced by the project have value because they can be used, potentially, to 
meet treaty or related regulatory obligations. In turn, this component of value depends critically 
on the specific institutions that govern their creation and use. Therefore, in our specification of 
the state variables that determine  ) (s Ω , we consider two classes of variables. 
The first includes general factors that influence the level of profit and the associated risk 
for all types of investments flowing into host countries. These variables describe a general 
investment climate and include variables related to policies, expected profitability and a variety of 
risks.
21 Factors that make up the investment climate are summarized by the ability of countries to 
attract international investors and we use total foreign direct investment (FDI) as our indicator of 
the general investment climate. Our measure is calculated by averaging the net inflows of foreign 
direct investment as a share of GDP reported by the World Bank (2006) over the study period, 
                                                 
18 The 194 parties to the Convention during the study period include all member countries of the United Nations 
plus the Cook Islands, the Holy See, and Niue, a former territory of New Zealand and one non-country member, the 
European Union. 
19 The name Annex II arises from the country-list annexes of the Framework Convention. Annex I contains the list 
of 36 countries, mostly OECD countries and transitional economies, that initially pledged to limit emissions. Annex 
II is the subset of wealthier Annex I countries. Prior to ratification, the list of countries capping emission changed 
and that eventual list of 39 countries is listed in Annex B of the Protocol. 
20 A list of countries included in the study Is given in annex table 1. 
21 See Chakrabarti (2001) for a review of the FDI literature.   13
1992-2001. Because this measure is an aggregate, it can be observed independently of bilateral 
investment flows. 
The second class of state variables relate to institutions that are more specific to emission 
trading. All things equal, it is likely that AIJ investing firms preferred to gain experience in host 
countries where local institutions could lower costs, reduce risk or otherwise give additional value 
to carbon credit streams flowing from joint implementation projects. Likewise, because investor-
country regulations were expected to influence how earned credits could be used, it is also likely 
that domestic investor-country institutions were important to observed investment outcomes. At 
the same time, because the AIJ pilots preceded the eventual treaty, investors had to anticipate 
how future institutions might evolve. In the applied model, we assume that related commitments 
by governments, extant during the study period, provide an indication of the capacity of host and 
investor countries to put implementing institutions in place; we use these to proxy investor 
judgments. We construct commitment indicator variables for investor and host countries based 
on their participation in five international agreements: the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, the United Nations 
Convention on Climate Change and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. To 
measure whether environmental issues are a policy priority, we also consider whether a country 
had an environmental strategy and a biodiversity action plan in place during the study period 
(World Bank, 2002). To identify countries with relatively strong institutions, we count the 
cumulative number of years between 1992 and 2001 that the environmental commitments were in 
place. Host and investor countries were separately ranked according to this cumulative measure 
and countries falling into the top of three respective quantiles were designated as highly 
committed to policies consistent with Kyoto objectives. 
As discussed in section 4, uncertainty over investment outcomes generates incentive delay 
otherwise desirable investment. This is especially true of long-lived carbon investment projects 
that depend especially on government institutions. Consequently, we include in the investment 
equation measures related to the capacity of host governments to sustain and carry-out processes 
leading to eventual carbon offset certification. In particular, we include a measure of government 
efficiency that relates to the quality of services provided by host governments and the political 
independence of their bureaucracies. We also include a measure of political stability that relates 
(inversely) to the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or toppled by external or 
internal violence. The measures used in the study are described in Kaufmann, Kraay and   14
Mastruzzi (2005).
22 Finally, we also include a dummy variable set to one for Norway, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, where subsidies were provided to domestic project 
participants (Michaelowa, Dixon and Abron, 1999). All things equal, the subsidies are expected to 
have lowered the investment threshold criteria for firms in the four countries. 
5.3.  State Variables Affecting Agency Choice 
As discussed, the applied model considers whether the same factors that determine bilateral aid 
flows also determine agency rankings of AIJ projects in the applied model -- that is, both aid and 
agency approval are a function of a set of common state variables,  z . Consequently, estimation 
of the applied model requires both a measure of bilateral aid and measures of the determinants of 
aid.  
For the first measure, we calculate an average value of real bilateral aid for the period 
1992 to 2001 for each investor-host dyad. These are based on from pair-wise data on Net Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to recipient countries from OECD country members as 
reported to the Development Assistance Committee (2006).  Observations on country pairs are 
set to zero when no official aid is reported over the study period. For the base model we use a 
dichotomous measure that indicates whether aid was given during the period. In subsequent 
analysis we consider a continuous measure. 
Specifying the variables determining the bilateral aid component of the applied model is 
more challenging. Although an extensive literature surrounds the question of why countries 
provide aid, there is little agreement on how to characterize the determinants. Following Dudley 
and Montmarquette (1976), most studies start with the assertion that observed aid flows can be 
explained by donor-country demand for specific outcomes that foreign aid helps to achieve and 
by recipient country characteristics that determine aid effectiveness. Nevertheless, in practice, 
applied studies ascribe a wide range of benign and predatory objectives to donor countries.
23 A 
material consequence has been an expanding list of potential determining factors. For our 
purposes, we use a selective but representative set of variables meant to capture the following 
host country characteristics: need, size, hegemony, democratic institutions, civil order and 
bureaucratic integrity. Other studies using these or similar variables include Frey and Schneider 
                                                 
22 Because indicators were not available for all study years, averages for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 were used. 
23 See, for example, Pronk (2001), and Petras and Veltmeyer (2002).   15
(1986), Wall (1995), Alesina and Weder (2002), and Collier and Dollar (2002). In particular, we 
use the following statistical measures. 
We take as our indictor of need, average per capita income for the period, measured in 
1995 $US. Because large countries are expected to have strategic importance, average host-
country population is included. Motivated by the presumption that donor countries want to 
influence the policies of neighbors and important trade partners, we include two fixed effects: one 
based on proximity and a second to indicate that the host and investor country have entered into 
bilateral or regional trade agreements.
24 Because most donors have voiced support for democratic 
principles, we include an indicator of the openness and accountability of host governments to 
their citizens, referred to in the tables as “voice and accountability”. Poorly performing 
bureaucracies and corruption are expected to diminish the efficacy of aid and discourage donor 
support. To capture this we include measures to indicate host countries with bureaucracies of 
above-average quality (government effectiveness) and where public and private sectors levels of 
corruption are below average (corruption). Political instability due to external or internal violence 
and armed conflict is expected to diminish the effectiveness of aid and we include this measure in 
our selection equation. At the same time, donors may also take a lack of civil order as an 
additional measure of need so that relationship between aid and civil order is ambiguous. The 
measures on income and population are averages for 1992-2001 (World Bank, 2006). The trade 
agreement and proximity variables are constructed. The institutional measures are described in 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzi (2005). 
6.  Empirical Results 
A simple prediction of the conceptual model is that, because donor-country agencies prefer 
projects that help achieve national policy objectives that are also pursued through bilateral aid, 
AIJ projects will be observed together with bilateral aid flows. At the same time, because firms 
are motivated to invest for separate reasons, not all countries receiving aid are expected to host 
projects. Among the 2,992 investor-host relationships in our sample, this simple prediction holds 
over study period averages. (See table 2.)  Moreover, in all but five of the 147 AIJ projects, 
bilateral aid was given during the year that the project was launched.
25  Even so, it is possible that 
                                                 
24 A dummy variable was set to one for investor-host dyads when both countries were members of the 
Commonwealth, ASEAN or NAFTA and for dyads containing an EU investor-country and a host country 
participating in the Phare program. 
25 See annex table 2 for more detail.   16
the observed pattern is incidental, especially since bilateral investor-host relationships are rare in 
the data while bilateral aid relationships are not. Consequently, as a first step in our analysis, we 
impose on the data the selection model described in section 4, which provides a statistical 
description of the selection and investment process. 
Selection model 
Estimation results for the applied model developed in section 4 are given in table 3.
 26 Overall, 
expecations based on the conceptual and applied models hold. The estimated parameters of both 
the investment and selection equations of the model are statistically significant for the most part 
and take the anticipated sign. Moreover, an expected correlation between the two equations is 
found that is statistically significant. A related Wald test, reported in the last row of table 3, 
suggests that the two equations are not independent. 
Results from the investment equation suggest that both investor and host country policies 
matter. The willingness of investor countries to offer subsidies and the commitment of investor 
countries to international environmental agreements are both significant determinants of 
predicted AIJ investments. Countries that put in place an attractive investment climate and share 
investor-country commitment to international environmental agreements are more likely to host 
AIJ investments, according to the estimation results. Countries that rank high in terms of political 
stability are also more likely to host AIJ investments. Government effectiveness is positively 
associated with AIJ investment flows, but not in a statistically significant way. 
Turning to the determinants of bilateral aid, the results suggest that need plays a role, with 
the probability of aid increasing as per capita income falls. Country size matters as do trade ties 
and proximity. Among the institutional measures, political stability and institutions that tend to 
expand political participation are positively and significantly related to expanded aid flows. Less 
stable governments were able to attract more bilateral aid, all things being equal, as were 
governments that scored poorly on indicators of corruption.
27 
The marginal effects of the investment determinants of are given in table 4. These are 
calculated at mean values; marginal effects for dichotomous variables are calculated from discrete 
changes. Generally, the probability changes are small in an absolute sense, although they are 
                                                 
26 For the estimates given in table 3, potential heterogeneity in the investment error term is accounted for by 
including information on the project count for each investor-host dyad. However the related adjustment to the 
estimated standard errors is not crucial for the reported parameter tests. See annex table 3. 
27 Other studies also find no evidence that corruption stalls aid flows. See especially Alesina and Weder (2002).   17
significant relative to the five percent predicted probability of investment. The results indicate 
that the marginal effects of several investor and host attributes are of similar scale.  Strong 
commitment to international environmental treaties and policies resulted in a two to three percent 
increase in predicted investment among potential partners. Surprisingly, the ability to attract direct 
investment generally had a quantitatively small effect on investment, even though the underlying 
parameter was statistically significant. More important was the related measure of political 
stability, which generated the largest marginal effect. 
7.  Alternative Estimates 
7.1.  Count data  
In this section we take up the question of whether results reported earlier depend 
significantly on our decision to view investment events as dichotomously measured partnerships. 
As an alternative, we consider the number of projects observed or project counts with the 
consequence that our applied models are expected to relate to different probability distributions.
28 
In a way that is analogous to our earlier analysis, it is possible to test whether the observed 
pattern of project counts is an outcome that is statistically unlikely and related to bilateral aid in 
the context of these alternative distributions. 
As a first step, we consider a mixed regime model. In this model, the probability of an 
event characterized by the set of investment determinants alone is compared to a mixed regime 
model in which the probability of project investment is decreased by an additional process. In 
particular, we estimate two zero-inflated models in order to test whether the mixed-regime model 
given in 4) can be set aside in favor of a standard Poisson or negative binomial regression 
consistent with 3). In contrast to selection models, it is possible, in the context of the mixed 
regime models, to test directly whether the probability of an investment is impinged upon by an 
additional process related to bilateral aid. Following Greene (1994), we used Vuong’s (1989) non-
nested test to make this determination. The test results, given in table 5, suggest that the mixed 
regime models better explain the project count data than do either the Poisson or the negative 
                                                 
28 As discussed, investment relationships are rare in our data. Moreover, when relationships are observed, the 
number of investment projects is generally low.  Both characteristics are suggestive of the Poisson and negative 
binomial distributions, which are associated with many forms of count data.   18
binomial regression model alone.
 29 We take this as evidence that the AIJ investment process was 
influenced by the same factors that describe bilateral aid flows. 
Though the mixed regime models are conceptually similar to selection models, there are 
differences related to how errors associated with the two processes are specified. With this in 
mind, we estimate an alternative model which retains the same probit selection structure as in the 
dichotomous model, but which uses a heterogeneous Poisson component, consistent with count 
data, for the investment equation (Greene 1997). Key estimation results are given in table 6. 
In general, the results from the count-based model are consistent with the dichotomous 
model discussed earlier. The estimated correlation between the Poisson and selection equations is 
statistically significant, suggested that the two components of the model are not independent. 
Because the model has been recast in terms of the project count data, the parameters associated 
with the investment equation take on a different scale. Even so, for the most part, variables that 
were statistically significant determinants of investment outcomes in the dichotomous model are 
significant for the count model as well and take on the same signs. The single exception is the 
subsidy variable, which remains positively associated with investments but not statistically so.  
The bilateral aid selection equation remains in probit form and consequently, the 
parameters retain the same scale. Generally, the estimated parameters coincide with the estimates 
from the dichotomous model, with the exception of the corruption measure, which is no longer 
statistically different from zero. 
7.2.  An alternative model of transaction costs 
Evidence from the previous sections suggests that the selection models, motivated by 
descriptions of AIJ approval procedures, are consistent with the data. Moreover, in the case of 
the zero-inflated count models, the role of determinants associated with bilateral aid in reducing 
AIJ investment is tested and found to be significant. Generally however, selection is asserted in 
the estimated models rather than directly tested.
30  In this section, we develop a related model that 
does not necessarily imply selection. The model is motivated by evidence of high transaction 
costs in related markets and potentially provides an alternative explanation for observed 
investment flows. Later, we discuss the implications of this alternative explanation for policy. 
                                                 
29 Detailed estimation results are given in annex table 4.  
30 Heckman (1979) discusses this general point.   19
In particular, we consider the role transaction costs play in emerging tradable permit 
markets. Broadly, transaction costs are expected to be present in most economic transactions and 
a key characteristic of developed economies are the multiple institutions that reduce transaction 
costs and related performance risk (North, 1987). This holds true especially for emission trading 
systems, where costs and uncertainties associated with finding reliable partners and gaining 
regulatory approval can be high. Stavins (1995), for one, argues that market-based regulatory 
approaches are often less cost-effective than anticipated because of transaction costs of varying 
kinds. In addition, there is evidence, primarily from the United States, that the success of tradable 
permit approaches depends significantly on containing transaction costs.
31 
For many reasons, transaction costs were likely high for AIJ projects. The national pilot 
programs were experimental in nature so that many of the practical problems of establishing 
partnerships, negotiating outcomes and establishing contracts had to be solved without prior 
experience or recognized conventions. Moreover, because agreement on Kyoto’s flexibility 
mechanisms had not been reached, there were limited incentives to build up public institutions 
that might reduce such costs. 
The implications of high transaction on AIJ and Kyoto project markets are related to 
studies showing that bilateral ties related to language, culture and history can significantly affect 
private investment choices and also bilateral aid flows (Kogut and Singh, 1988).  Consequently, it 
may be that observed patterns of AIJ pilot investment reflect the joint consequences of deep-
seated bilateral relationships that reduce project transaction costs and encourage flows of bilateral 
aid. This may be reflected in the implied preferences of agencies charged with approving AIJ 
projects, but may also be linked more fundamentally in private transaction costs as well. 
How this influences the statistical model depends on the mechanism by which cultural 
ties affect costs. If, because of their effect on transaction costs, an absence of traditional bilateral 
ties works to eliminate otherwise desirable investments, the selection model still applies, although 
the role of aid takes on an alternative interpretation. In this instance, any limiting actions taken by 
approving agencies reflects the effects of latent long-lived cultural ties, for which bilateral aid 
serves as a convenient instrument. Alternatively, it may be that the role culture plays in 
determining investment is less crucial and can be considered as one of several factors determining 
                                                 
31 See Cason and Gangadharan (2003) and references therein.   20
profitability. This is the approach taken in studies focusing on the composition of foreign direct 
investment. 
Asserting that investment is feasible, even when bilateral ties are absent, greatly simplifies 
the statistical model. Statistical difficulties related to selection can be set aside and a simple 
dichotomous model can be defined in which the same set of determinants used to represent s in 
the earlier analysis are expanded to include bilateral aid as a proxy for bilateral ties. However, as a 
practical matter, the absence of bilateral aid predicts perfectly the absence of joint implementation 
in the current data. It is therefore necessary to redefine the bilateral aid variable in a way that 
distinguishes among varying levels of strength in bilateral ties. We do this by ranking the investor-
host dyads where aid flows are observed by the average share of each donor’s total ODA budget. 
We subsequently sort the dyads into three quantiles. Those countries that fall into the top quantile 
– that is, those countries that receive disproportionate shares of a particular donor’s bilateral aid – 
are considered to have the strongest bilateral ties.  
Because the bilateral components of transaction costs are expected to be deep-seated and 
long-standing, we treat the relationship between culture and transaction costs as recursive in the 
statistical model with the consequence that regression methods can be employed. However, one 
additional complication remains for the recursive statistical model. This has to do with the finding 
that standard regression approaches can underestimate the probability of an investment event 
when observed events are rare. For this reason, we make use of a logistic regression approach 
suggested by King and Zeng (2001) that adjusts for rare-event bias. For comparison purposes, we 
also report results from a standard probit regression. As with the earlier model, the number of 
bilateral AIJ projects is used to account for heterogeneity in the residuals of both models. 
Results from this exercise are given in table 7. The statistical significance of the estimated 
parameters of the two models are similar and largely correspond to levels of significance found 
for the investment equation parameters in table 3.  The notable exception is the investment 
climate parameter which is no longer significant in the recursive models. The added parameter on 
the bilateral aid, which in this case represents cultural ties that reduce transaction costs, is 
significant for both the probit and corrected logistic regression models.  
Since the two models are derived from different distributional assumptions, the values of 
the parameters cannot be directly compared; however, estimates from both models can be used 
to analyze the marginal effects of changes in the investment determinants on the probability of   21
investment. For the dichotomous determinants in both models, the marginal effects presented in 
the table correspond to changes in the AIJ investment probability for a discrete (zero to one) 
change in the corresponding determinant. For the probit model, average marginal probabilities 
are calculated around the variable means. For the logistic model, reported marginal effects are 
based on first-difference estimates (assignable probabilities) from stochastic simulations around 
the 25
th  and 75
th percentile value of the continuous determinants.
32 
Despite potential differences due to how marginal effects are calculated and biases related 
to a prevalence of non-events in the data, the estimated marginal probabilities from the two 
recursive models are similar. The marginal probabilities in table 7 are slightly lower than those in 
table 4. Determinants that are estimated to improve investment probabilities by two to three 
percent in the selection model are estimated to improve investment probabilities by one to two 
percent in the recursive models. At the same time, strong bilateral ties, as reflected by a larger 
share of ODA flows, increase the probability of investment by roughly 2.4 percent in the 
recursive models. 
8.  Conclusions 
Case studies describe approval processes under the AIJ pilots that allowed general national policy 
objectives to influence project investment outcomes. Our findings are consistent with this 
characterization and suggest, more specifically, that AIJ investments were partly determined by 
the same factors that determined bilateral aid. Quantitative evidence supporting this conclusion is 
robust and holds up under a series of alternative specifications. 
As discussed, often-used conceptual models of how markets might work under an 
implemented Kyoto Protocol are not fully consistent with this depiction of how investments were 
determined under the AIJ pilots. Further, if the institutional arrangements built up to approve 
projects under the national pilots are maintained as the Kyoto Protocol is implemented, our 
findings suggest that the pool of feasible investment projects will be constrained and the potential 
benefits of the flexibility mechanisms reduced. In a related way, our findings suggest that the 
national institutions built to approve AIJ projects are inconsistent with the prevalent least-cost 
models of greenhouse gas abatement used to predict the benefits of the Kyoto Protocol’s 
flexibility mechanisms. Consequently, if AIJ institutions are adopted without modification under 
the Kyoto Protocol, investment outcomes will differ from those generally anticipated. 
                                                 
32 See Tomz, King and Zeng (1999).   22
A more nuanced interpretation of the link between aid and investment is that the 
selection process reflected in the described behavior of agencies charged with reviewing and 
approving projects under AIJ is related to a deeper set of bilateral ties that reduce otherwise 
insurmountable transaction costs. The selection model results are consistent with this 
interpretation, as are estimates from alternative recursive models. Moreover, since projects 
without agency approval are not observed, it is impossible to distinguish between the two 
interpretations. For policy, this distinction is substantive, since it implies that hurdles would 
remain related to transaction costs, even if agency approval processes were transparent, objective 
and devoid of policy bias. This, in turn, would suggest that a broader set of institutions are 
needed to reduce project transaction costs other than those currently embodied in traditional 
bilateral ties. 
Even so, under current conditions, the findings suggest that national policy goals did not 
exclusively drive the AIJ investment process, leaving room for host countries to influence 
outcomes by taking up specific policies. Not surprisingly, there is evidence that host-country 
efforts to put in place institutions fostering a positive general investment climate, political stability 
and a commitment to international environmental law influenced AIJ investments in a positive 
way. By implication, countries that take policies that support investment generally and build the 
specific institutions needed to facilitate Kyoto-related markets will likely see greater investment 
flows under the Protocol’s Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism provisions. 
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Tables 
Table 1: AIJ projects included in the sample, 1992-2001 by host and investor countries. 
Investor countries  Projects  Host countries 
Australia   10  Chile, Fiji, Indonesia (3), Mauritius (2), Solomon Islands (2), Vietnam 
Belgium   1  Croatia 
Canada   2  Jordan, Zimbabwe 
France   5  Czech Republic, Hungary, Jordan, Mauritania, Zimbabwe 
Germany  6  Czech Republic, Jordan, Latvia, Russia (2), Zimbabwe 
Italy   2  Jordan, Morocco 
Japan   5  China (3), Thailand, Vietnam 
Netherlands  16  Bhutan, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Hungary (2), Latvia (2), 
Poland (2), Romania, Russia (2), Slovak Republic (2), South Africa 
Norway  6  Burkina Faso, China, India, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic 
Sweden  51  Estonia (21), Latvia (21), Lithuania (9) 
Switzerland  2  Romania, Slovak Republic 
United States  41  Argentina (2), Belize (2), Bolivia (3), Chile (4), Costa Rica (7), Czech 
Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, El Salvador, Guatemala (3), 
Honduras (2), Indonesia, Mali, Mexico (4), Nicaragua, Panama, Russia (4), 




Table 2: Bilateral aid and AIJ partnerships 
  Bilateral aid, investor to host 
AIJ projects  no  yes 
no 347  2,580 
yes 0  65 
   27
 
Table 3: Probit selection model results. 
Determinants Coefficient  Std.  Error 
AIJ investment equation    
Investor attributes    
AIJ subsidy  0.230a  0.058 
Investor commitment  0.267a  0.066 
Host attributes    
Investment climate  0.017b  0.008 
Host commitment  0.205b  0.104 
Government effectiveness  0.037  0.093 
Political stability  0.329a  0.116 
Constant  ‐1.805a  0.426 
Bilateral aid equation (selection)    
Income  ‐0.112a  0.010 
Population  0.210a  0.014 
Proximity  0.651a  0.141 
Trade agreement  0.335a  0.110 
Government effectiveness  0.126a  0.016 
Political stability  ‐0.149a  0.007 
Voice and accountability  0.120a  0.038 
Corruption  ‐0.183a  0.042 
Constant  ‐1.312a  0.182 
Independence test    
Correlation estimate, ρ  ‐0.834  0.060 
Wald test, ρ equals zero  χ2(1)= 36.52a   
Note: a and b denote statistical significance at the 1, and 5 percent level, respectively. 
Potential heterogeneity in the investment error term is accounted for by including 
information on the project count for each investor-host dyad 
 
Table 4: Average marginal effects. 
Investment determinant  Marginal effects 
Investor attributes   
AIJ subsidy*  0.0261 
Investor commitment*  0.0291 
Host attributes   
Investment climate  0.0017 
Host commitment*  0.0218 
Government effectiveness 0.0037 
Political stability  0.0329 
Note: a and b denote statistical significance at the 1, and 5 percent level, respectively; * 
indicates that marginal values are based on a discrete change in the dichotomous 
determinant. The predicted probability of an investment relationship is 0.0482.   28
Table 5: Mixed regime test statistics 
  Vuong test score
Mixed model versus standard Poisson  2.59a 
Mixed model versus standard negative binomial 3.53a 
a denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table 6: Results from Poisson-selection model. 
Determinants Coefficient  Std.  Error 
AIJ investment equation    
Investment climate  0.002c  0.028 
AIJ subsidy  0.405  0.331 
Host commitment  0.822b  0.344 
Investor commitment  1.314a  0.313 
Government effectiveness  0.083  0.297 
Political stability  0.724a  0.275 
Constant  ‐6.338a  0.580 
Bilateral aid equation (selection)    
Income  ‐0.117a  0.044 
Population  0.225a  0.028 
Proximity  0.581a  0.136 
Trade agreement  0.445a  0.143 
Government effectiveness  0.125  0.134 
Political stability  ‐0.134c  0.071 
Voice and accountability  0.140b  0.058 
Corruption  ‐0.192  0.137 
Constant  ‐1.505a  0.576 







Note: a, b and c denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Estimation results for models without selection. 
  Probit Model  Adjusted Logistic Model 
 Coefficient  Std.  error  Average  marginal 
probability 
Coefficient Std.  error Attributable 
probability 
Investment climate  0.013 0.011  0.0004  0.033  0.024 0.0009 
AIJ subsidy*  0.308a  0.091 0.0123 0.726a  0.206 0.0115 
Host commitment*  0.246b  0.122 0.0086 0.520b  0.262 0.0066 
Investor commitment*  0.496a  0.108 0.0199 1.096a  0.153 0.0175 
Government effectiveness  0.122  0.077 0.0039 0.232  0.147 0.0021 
Political stability  0.293a  0.108 0.0093 0.677a  0.246 0.0105 
High share of bilateral aid*  0.567a  0.114 0.0245 1.227a  0.185 0.0241 
Constant  -2.628a  0.411    -5.133 1.247   
Note: a and b denote statistical significance at the 1, and 5 percent level, respectively; * indicates dichotomous variables. Predicted probability 
of an investment relationship was 0.012 and 0.013 for the probit and adjusted logistic models respectively.  
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Annex table 1: List of countries included in the study.  
Investor countries  Host Countries 
Australia  Albania  Central African Rep. Fiji  Kyrgyz  Rep.  Nigeria St.  Lucia 
Austria  Algeria  Chad  Gabon  Laos  Oman  St.Vincent & Grenadines
Belgium Angola  Chile  Gambia  Latvia  Pakistan  Sudan 
Canada Argentina  China  Georgia Lebanon  Panama  Swaziland 
Denmark  Armenia  Colombia  Ghana  Lesotho  Papua New Guinea  Syria 
Finland Azerbaijan  Comoros  Grenada Liberia  Paraguay  Tajikistan 
France  Bahamas  Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) Guatemala Lithuania  Peru  Tanzania 
Germany Bangladesh  Congo,  Rep.  Guinea Macedonia  Philippines  Thailand 
Greece Barbados  Costa  Rica  Guinea-Bissau Madagascar  Poland  Togo 
Ireland Belarus  Cote  d'Ivoire  Guyana Malawi  Romania  Trinidad  &  Tobago 
Italy Belize  Croatia Haiti  Malaysia  Russia  Tunisia 
Japan Benin  Cyprus  Honduras Maldives  Rwanda  Uganda 
Luxembourg Bhutan  Czech  Republic Hungary  Mali  Samoa  Ukraine 
Netherlands Bolivia  Djibouti  India  Mauritania  Sao Tome & Principe Uruguay 
New Zealand  Bosnia-Herzegovina  Dominica  Indonesia Mauritius  Senegal  Uzbekistan 
Norway Botswana  Dominican  Republic Iran Mexico  Seychelles  Vanuatu 
Portugal Brazil  Ecuador  Israel  Moldova  Sierra  Leone Venezuela 
Spain Bulgaria  Egypt  Jamaica  Mongolia Singapore  Viet  Nam 
Sweden  Burkina Faso  El Salvador  Jordan Morocco  Slovak  Republic  Yemen 
Switzerland Burundi  Equatorial  Guinea  Kazakstan Mozambique  Slovenia  Zambia 
United Kingdom  Cambodia  Eritrea  Kenya Nepal  Solomon  Islands  Zimbabwe 
United States  Cameroon  Estonia  Korea Nicaragua South  Africa   
  Cape Verde  Ethiopia  Kuwait  Niger  Sri Lanka   
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Annex table 2: Instances when bilateral aid and project start dates were not cotemporaneous. 
Investor Host    Number of 
projects 
Project start 
dates  Years in which bilateral aid did occur
Australia  Chile  1  1999  1992-1994, 1996-1997, 2000-2001 
Netherlands  Hungary  1  1994  1992-1993, 1995, 1998-20001 
Netherlands  Latvia  1  1997  1992-1993, 1995, 1998-2001 
Netherlands Russia  2  1994  1992-1993,  1995-2001 
Netherlands  Slovak Republic  2  1999  1992-1993, 1995, 1997, 2001 
Source: UNFCCC, World Bank and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Annex table 3: Probit selection model without heterogeneity adjustment  
Determinants Parameter  Std.  error 
AIJ Investment equation    
Investment climate  0.017b  0.009 
AIJ subsidy  0.230b  0.104 
Host commitment  0.205b  0.095 
Investor commitment  0.267a  0.096 
Government effectiveness  0.037  0.094 
Political stability  0.329a  0.089 
Constant  ‐1.805a  0.125 
Bilateral Aid equation    
Income  ‐0.112a  0.038 
Population  0.210a  0.026 
Proximity  0.651a  0.120 
Trade agreement  0.335a  0.125 
Government effectiveness  0.126  0.127 
Political stability  ‐0.149b  0.066 
Voice and accountability  0.120b  0.053 
Corruption  ‐0.183  0.124 
Constant  ‐1.312a  0.499 
Independence Test     
Correlation estimate, ρ  ‐0.834  0.056 
LR test, ρ equals zero  χ2(1)=25.00a   
Note: a and b denote statistical significance at the 1, and 5 percent level, respectively    32
 
Annex table 4: Mixed regime model results. 
  Poisson - logit  Negative binomial- logit 
Determinants Parameter  Std.  error Parameter Std.  error 
Project investment count      
Investment climate  0.040b  0.020  0.051  0.041 
AIJ subsidy  1.028a  0.230  1.535a  0.458 
Host commitment  -0.094 0.234 0.548  0.423 
Investor commitment  -0.605a  0.210  0.612c  0.352 
Government effectiveness  0.677a  0.250  0.696  0.571 
Political stability  0.125 0.239 0.277  0.429 
Constant  0.221 0.260  ‐2.205a  0.493 
Bilateral Aid equation      
Income  0.064 0.194 0.033  0.253 
Population  -0.321a  0.089  ‐0.356a  0.131 
Proximity  -2.244a  0.347  ‐2.902a  0.617 
Trade agreement  0.653c  0.373  0.788  0.586 
Government effectiveness  -0.819 0.639 ‐0.166  1.008 
Political stability  -0.505 0.349 ‐0.488  0.521 
Voice and accountability  -0.146 0.253 ‐0.074  0.346 
Corruption  0.943 0.598 0.611  0.788 
Constant  8.674a  2.062  7.881a  2.889 
Ln(α)     1.623a  0.415 
Alternative model tests      
LR test vs. zero-inflated Poisson     χ2(1)=89.30a   
Vuong test vs. standard negative 
binomial 
2.59a    3.53a   
Note: a, b and c denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively  
 
 